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Abstract
This paper examines the extent to which borrowing constraints restrict
rm access to credit and identies individual, rm, and loan characteristics,
which determine the cost of capital in Vietnamese manufacturing. Using di-
rect information from a Vietnamese enterprise survey I show that 14 percent
of the enterprises are credit constrained, and these enterprises would increase
their debt holdings by 34 percent if borrowing constraints were relaxed. More-
over, it emerges that informal credit markets play an important role for fast
growing rms. Enterprises do not appear to have the necessary time to go
through the many administrative di¢ culties in the formal credit system if
they want to seize the day. Finally, collateralized loans face larger interest
rates, explained by the signicant inuence of policy lending in Vietnamese
credit markets.
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1 Introduction
A former Vietnamese Secretary General once stated that Vietnam has, in princi-
ple, three problems related to future economic development: Capital, capital and
capital (see MPDF ,1997). According to a recent survey by MPDF (1997) the
private small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs) share this view in the sence
that they perceive their main obstacles to growth as Credit, credit and credit. In
the early 1990s concern among donors and Vietnamese o¢ cials about the malfunc-
tioning of nancial markets gave rise to the promotion and establishment of formal
credit institutions targeted at the poor. Moreover, the government announced that
policy-induced lending by State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs), primarily to
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), would be phased out. However, the SOCBs con-
tinued to serve mainly the SOEs, and doubt regarding the ability of public banks
and the nancial system in general to full the growing demand for credit from the
fast growing private sector emerged.
Previous studies on credit constraints have due to lack of direct measures of
credit constraints typically identied unconstrained rms by dividing the sample
under consideration according to the ratio of nancial assets to the market value
of the rm (Fazzari et al., 1988).1 In this paper a more direct approach is applied.
I categorize rms as being credit constrained based on replies to direct questions
about whether the rm applied for credit and if they applied whether they were
denied access. I then use information for the non-constrained rms to get an es-
timate of actual debt demand, and use this estimate to measure desired debt for
constrained rms, based on observed individual rm specic characteristics. This
paper therefore has two main objectives. First, using a Vietnamese enterprise survey
conducted in 2002 I identify credit constrained SMEs directly, determine whether
there exists a gap between desired debt and observed debt, and establish an es-
timate of the magnitude of borrowing constraints. Second, I use information on
1See Schiantarelli (1996) for an overview of the problems faced when using the q-type and the
Euler equation approaches.
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credit access and interest rates to identify determinants of credit access and the
cost of capital facing Vietnamese SMEs.
Credit constraints and establishing the magnitude hereof have important policy
implications. Di¤erences in the cost of internal and external nancing can inuence
the way in which the e¤ects of scal policy and monetary policy are perceived. As
summarized in Hubbard (1998) contractionary monetary policy raises the cost of
external nancing relatively more for constrained rms, both in terms of higher
interest rates and as a larger spread between internal and external funds. Con-
sequently, investment tends to be lower, than in unconstrained rms. Moreover,
identifying characteristics of credit constrained rms can help policy makers to tar-
get rms which are more likely to face binding credit constraints, such as young
non-household rms.
The main results are that only 14 percent of Vietnamese SMEs are credit con-
strained, and these enterprises would increase their debt holdings 34 percent if
borrowing constraints were relaxed. The data furthermore suggest that larger rms
have access to cheaper credit, and although male entrepreneurs obtain credit more
frequently, there seems to be no discrimination against women. The probability of
accessing credit is higher in rural areas, but rural rms at the same time experi-
ence larger credit constraints, indicating that demand for external funds is signi-
cantly higher in rural areas than in the three larger urban cities, Ho Chi Minh City
(HCMC), Hanoi and Haiphong. Moreover, non-household enterprises often face
larger credit constraints, suggesting that a shift in the present policy focus from
the smaller household rms towards supporting larger private and limited liability
companies maybe justied. Finally, borrower-lender relationships reduce interest
rates, suggesting that relationship lending provides important information about
borrower quality in the segmented Vietnamese credit market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 identies the
characteristics of credit constrained SMEs in Vietnam and estimates the magnitude
of these constraints. Section 3 put focus on the rms, which get access to credit,
and examines the empirical determinants of credit availability and the interest rate
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on the most recent loan. Section 4 concludes.
2 Identifying credit constrained rms
Most of the empirical literature concerning rm credit constraints focuses on either
q-models of investment or on an Euler equation approach (for excellent overviews see
Hubbard, 1998 and Schiantarelli, 1996). As an example, the latter approach relies
on the Euler equation to describe the rms choice of capital stock in modeling in-
vestment decisions. To check whether credit constraints are present over-identifying
restrictions are added to the Euler equation and tests for model misspecication are
carried out. According to Bigsten et al. (2003) most studies nd signicant e¤ects
of such restrictions, leading to the conclusion that rms are credit constrained. I
take a more direct approach, using survey data for SMEs in Vietnam to identify
liquidity constrained rms.
2.1 Data
The data were generated in an enterprise survey conducted in 2002, gathering in-
formation for the years 2000 and 2001, respectively. The survey covered over 1,600
enterprises in four provinces (Ha Tay, Long An, Quang Nam and Phu Tho) and
three cities (HCMC, Hanoi and Haiphong), focusing on the non-state sector. In
all the areas covered by the survey, the sample was stratied by ownership form
to ensure the inclusion of all types of non-state enterprises, including household,
private, co-operative rms, limited companies and share-holding companies. The
stratication, ensured rst, that household enterprises account for about 70 per-
cent of the enterprises (Sakai and Takata, 2000) and, second, that the 30 percent
non-household (and non-state) enterprises were divided according to GSO (2004):
Private enterprises (39 percent), co-operatives (7 percent), limited companies (37
percent), joint-stock companies (4 percent) and foreign invested rms (4 percent).
For reasons of implementation the survey was conned to specic areas in each
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province/city. After data cleaning 1119 entries survived.2
Table 1 displays sample means for selected variables covering the whole sample
and for sub-samples where rms hold debt and are unconstrained in their access
to credit, respectively. In transpires, rst of all, that Vietnamese rms have a
relative low debt to assets share, conrming that a large part of investment nancing
by Vietnamese SMEs is done through retained earnings. Furthermore, only 14
percent of the enterprises in the data consider themselves credit constrained, while
54 percent hold positive debt.3
Firms that are unconstrained do not di¤er much from constrained rms in terms
of size measured by average total assets and revenue. Moreover, it seems as if
constrained rms are on average experiencing larger growth rates (measured as the
growth in real revenue from 2000 to 2001) than unconstrained rms. From column
two in Table 1 it can be seen that rms holding debt are often larger and grow faster
than non-debt holders. Debt holders are often relatively young rms, and older rms
are often on average less credit constrained than their younger counterparts.
Another group of variables includes characteristics of the owner. Enterprises
are primarily owned by men (77.8 percent).4 Male owned rms are more likely
to hold debt, but on average there seems to be no gender discrimination in credit
markets. Relatively more men are credit constrained. Regarding measures of the
level of human capital, I combined information on average educational level of
the enterprise owner and data on whether the owner had any longer-term formal
or informal experience prior to establishing the rm. On this basis, skills were
categorized as high, medium or low,5 and it appears that a relatively large part of
2Further details on the survey and sampling procedures can be found in Rand et al. (2004).
3I identify whether or not a rm is credit constrained from replies to direct questions about
whether rms were denied credit when they applied.
4This nding can be contrasted with Vijverberg and Haughton (2004) analysing non-farm
enterprises in the Vietnamese Living Standards Survey (VLSS). They report that only 43% of the
enterprises are male owned. However, this might reect that the question posed in the VLSS is
Who among the household members is most knowledgeable about the activities of the enterprise,
which is not directly a question about ownership.
5The owner was classied as being highly skilled if he had either more than 12 years of schooling
or prior long-term formal experience in the line of business in question. Medium skilled owners have
formal education between 8 and 12 years or prior long-term informal experience in the particular
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the low skilled owners are debt holders. Regarding credit constraints there does not
seem to be much di¤erence between constrained and unconstrained groups in terms
of educational level.
Table 1: Mean statistics
Total Sample Debt Holders Unconstrained
Assets (log) 12:775 12:860 12:772
Revenue (log) 12:425 12:703 12:390
Revenue growth 0:101 0:122 0:091
Protshare 0:165 0:170 0:160
Age 11:219 10:492 11:348
Gender 0:778 0:804 0:769
High skilled 0:298 0:271 0:292
Medium skilled 0:375 0:356 0:380
Low skilled 0:327 0:373 0:328
HCMC 0:154 0:119 0:166
Hanoi 0:163 0:130 0:169
Haiphong 0:163 0:125 0:169
Ha Tay 0:181 0:221 0:177
Long An 0:145 0:161 0:139
Phu Tho 0:101 0:130 0:097
Quang Nam 0:094 0:114 0:083
Household enterprise 0:734 0:691 0:753
Private rm 0:091 0:110 0:079
Cooperative 0:081 0:077 0:084
Limited/Share holding 0:094 0:122 0:083
Debt share 0:084 0:158 0:078
Unconstrained 0:857 0:844 1:000
Positive debt holders 0:534 1:000 0:527
Observations 1119 598 959
Table 1 also identies a set of rm specic characteristics, related to ownership
structure and location. Location is modelled using indicator variables representing
each area. The 2002 survey covered three urban cities HCMC, Hanoi, and Haiphong,
and four rural provinces Ha Tay, Long An, Phu Tho and Quang Nam, and it is
noticeable that a relatively large part of the enterprises in rural areas are debt
holders. Moreover, credit constraints seem to be relatively more prevalent in rural
areas as well. Turning to ownership structure, private enterprises as well as limited
line of business. Finally, low skilled owners have either no prior experience or less than 8 years of
schooling.
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and share holding companies are relatively more credit constrained than household
rms, as shown by the drop in the share from the total sample in column 1 to
the unconstrained sample in column 3. Moreover, the proportion of household
enterprises is lower in the debt holders group than in the entire sample. Finally,
it seems as if reinvested prot is still a major source of rm nancing in Vietnam,
given the relative low debt to assets share (8.7 percent).
2.2 Empirical model
Joint analysis of the desired level of debt and credit constrained rms can be per-
formed using a two step sample selection model, which has only been used in
analysing credit constrained households in the US (see Cox and Jappelli, 1993,
and Duca and Rosenthal, 1993). In this approch it is recorded whether enterprises
with positive debt holdings are credit constrained and conditional on being a credit
constrained rm, holding positive debt, I estimate the desired level of debt of the
individual rm. Assume that the desired level of debt to assets ratio, d, for rm i,
is a linear function of a vector of observables x1i.
di = x1i1 + "1i (1)
where "1i is a random component for rm i. The underlying estimation problem
is that the desired debt to asset share for rm i (described by di) is only observed
if the demand for debt is positive (bi = 1) and the rm is not credit constrained
(ni = 1). A direct estimate of equation 1 is therefore likely to be biased, if the
variables which determine whether a rm is credit constrained or has debt also
a¤ect the level of desired debt. Given that some rms prefer not to hold debt,
equation 2 controls for the fact that debt holdings are truncated from below by
zero.
bi = 1[x2i2 + "2i > 0] (2)
where bi is a binary variable, which takes the value of one if the rm holds
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positive debt, x2i contains proxies for the convenience of having debt, and "2i is a
rm specic error term.
Direct measures of credit constraints have generally not been available in previ-
ous studies, and Jappelli (1990) show that the indirect proxies used often generate
large errors when classifying unconstrained individuals. This highlight the advan-
tages of identifying directly whether or not a rm is credit constrained as done in
the present study. The underlying latent variable credit constraint model is given
by equation 3
ni = 1[x3i3 + "3i > 0] (3)
where ni is a binary variable, which takes the value of one if the rm is non-
constrained, x3i is a vector of credit constraint proxies, and "3i is a random error
term for rm i.
The inverse Mills ratios from the estimates of equations 2 and 3 are used to cor-
rect for selection bias, ensuring consistent estimates of the debt demand in equation
1. The equation for di for the selected sample is therefore
E(dijbi = 1; ni = 1) = x1i1 + E("1ijbi = 1; ni = 1) (4)
Following Cox and Jappelli (1993) I assume that the error terms are normally
distributed with mean zero and variance 1; 2 and 3, respectively. I also use the
standard probit normalization (2 = 3 = 1) to obtain consistent estimates of 2
and 3. Estimating debt demand therefore boils down to
di = x1i1 +
(bi)
F (bi)
2 +
(ni)
F (ni)
3 (5)
where (b)
F (b)
and (n)
F (n)
are the inverse Mills ratios, and () and F () are the
probability and cumulative distribution function, respectively.
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2.3 Credit demand and constraints
A reduced form rm debt demand function can be estimated using only uncon-
strained rms that hold positive debt. Table 2 presents the regressions for be-
ing unconstrained and for holding positive debt, respectively. It is clear that the
probability of being unconstrained is larger in the urban areas HCMC, Hanoi and
Haiphong than in the rural provinces of Ha Tay, Long An, Phu Tho and Quang
Nam. This is in accordance with Van de Walle and Cratty (2004), who state that
post-reform government policies in terms of access to credit has tended to favour
urban areas. Furthermore, private rms as well as limited and share holding com-
panies are less likely to be unconstrained. This is contrary to the general perception
that nancing constraints are more binding for smaller rms, which have a higher
probability of going bankrupt (the positive relationship between size and survival).6
Results from the estimation of the debt incidence equation indicate that the
probability of holding debt increases with revenue earnings. Moreover, holding
debt is negatively related to age. Older rms are often more settled and less likely
to engage in activities that require capital demanding initiatives, which is in accor-
dance with ndings that older rm are less innovative. Higher levels of education
reduce the probability of having positive debt. This nding is somewhat surprising
given the expectation that higher education should a¤ect investment possibilities
and thereby increase the probability of holding debt.
Table 3 report results for both the unadjusted generalized tobit estimation and
the debt equation corrected for the two sources of selection bias (column 2 and 3
are without and with exclusion restrictions, respectively). Total assets and revenue
earnings exert opposing e¤ects on the demand for debt, where increasing assets
lower the desired debt share by around 3-4 percent, and larger revenue earnings
increase desired debt share by approximately 8 percent. In the unadjusted case
age comes out insignicant, however adjusting for the selection bias it turns out
that older rms have lower demand for debt than their younger counterparts. A
6The results reported here are consistent with Hansen et al. (2004), who document that the
positive correlation between rm size and survival is not present in these data.
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Table 2: Non-constrained rms holding positive debt
Unconstrained Debt Incidence
Coe¢ cient t-statistics Coe¢ cient t-statistics
Assets (log)  0:012 (0:86)  0:007 (0:31)
Revenue (log) 0:000 (0:03) 0:104 (5:57)
Revenue growth  0:037 (1:45)  0:002 (0:05)
Prot share  0:119 (1:89)  0:061 (0:53)
Age 0:000 (0:07)  0:006 (2:50)
Gender  0:029 (1:12) 0:062 (1:57)
High skilled 0:002 (0:08)  0:191 (4:46)
Medium skilled 0:018 (0:75)  0:133 (3:43)
Hanoi  0:055 (1:22) 0:078 (1:36)
Haiphong  0:069 (1:57) 0:076 (1:31)
Ha Tay  0:200 (3:99) 0:368 (6:84)
Long An  0:188 (3:63) 0:283 (4:96)
Phu Tho  0:213 (3:54) 0:378 (6:41)
Quang Nam  0:235 (3:72) 0:352 (5:55)
Private  0:127 (3:00) 0:061 (1:01)
Coop  0:034 (0:72) 0:039 (0:58)
Limited/Share holding  0:198 (3:59) 0:105 (1:54)
Observations 1119 1119
Pseudo R-sq 0.07 0.12
Probit estimates, marginal e¤ects. *, **, *** indicate signicance at a 10%, 5% and
1% level, respectively. Base: Low skilled, HCMC, household enterprise. All regressions
included a constant term. The probit for holding debt and the probit for being un-
constrained may have correlated errors. A bi-variate probit was therefore estimated.
The correlation between the errors in the two equations was not signicantly di¤erent
from zero, so estimation proceeded, treating the two equations as independent selection
criteria.
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plausible explanation is that rms over the lifecycle increase the probability of
self-nancing and over time get less innovative, thereby reducing their demand
for external funds. Moreover, the negative gender e¤ect in the unadjusted equation
disappears when including the two selection terms. This nding, combined with the
results in Table 2, suggests that there is no direct discrimination against women in
Vietnamese credit markets. This is contrary to the ndings in Fafchamps (2000)
for the manufacturing sector in the African region where a gender bias is found,
suggesting the existence of regional di¤erences. The coe¢ cients on the demographic
variables are quite clear. Highly skilled owners have signicantly lower demand
for debt in the adjusted estimations, supporting the somewhat surprising results
described above. The demand for debt is relatively high in rural areas. The fast
demise of the credit cooperative system in the rst phase of the Doi Moi reform may
be responsible for the unfullled credit demand and the credit constraints facing
rural areas.
Finally, Table 3 shows that the demand for debt is signicantly higher among
private rms, cooperatives, limited and share holding companies as compared to
household enterprises. Not surprisingly limited liability and share holding compa-
nies demand 52 percent more external funds as compared to household enterprises,
and they also have the highest rates of unsuccessful loan applications (not reported,
see Rand et al., 2004 for details).
2.4 The credit gap
The credit gap can be dened as the di¤erence between the average desired level
of debt, d (the sum of constrained rmsdesired debt dc and unconstrained rms
desired debt duc), and the average actual debt da (the sum of constrained rms
actual debt dac and the actual debt of unconstrained rms d
a
uc). Therefore for rms
that are not credit constrained duc = dauc. The average gap between desired and
acual debt can be written as
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Table 3: Debt demand
Unadjusted Selectivity adj Selectivity adj. (identied)
Coe¤. t-stats Coe¤. t-stats Coe¤. t-stats
Assets (log)  0:041 (3:58)  0:027 (1:93)  0:039 (4:20)
Revenue (log) 0:026 (2:81) 0:084 (3:40) 0:081 (3:32)
Revenue growth 0:051 (2:65) 0:112 (3:71) 0:091 (4:17)
Prot share  0:053 (1:11) 0:097 (1:04)
Age  0:001 (1:42)  0:005 (3:04)  0:005 (2:85)
Gender  0:039 (2:24) 0:044 (1:28) 0:025 (0:90)
High Skilled 0:017 (0:90)  0:099 (2:15)  0:085 (1:98)
Medium skilled 0:012 (0:85)  0:094 (2:33)  0:075 (2:23)
Hanoi  0:097 (3:28) 0:006 (0:13)  0:017 (0:44)
Haiphong  0:077 (2:43) 0:036 (0:70) 0:005 (0:14)
Ha Tay  0:048 (1:65) 0:408 (2:38) 0:308 (2:49)
Long An 0:007 (0:23) 0:390 (2:66) 0:305 (2:88)
Phu Tho 0:008 (0:23) 0:495 (2:69) 0:391 (2:88)
Quang Nam  0:042 (1:09) 0:456 (2:43) 0:344 (2:55)
Private 0:052 (2:01) 0:267 (3:00) 0:202 (3:76)
Coop 0:130 (3:91) 0:212 (4:42) 0:192 (4:54)
Limited/Share holding 0:216 (6:26) 0:520 (3:97) 0:433 (5:32)
Non-constrained  0:909 (2:22)  0:603 (2:72)
Debt incidence 0:422 (2:55) 0:374 (2:44)
Observations 505 505 505
R-squared 0.27 0.29 0.28
Dependent variable: Total debt to assets share. Generalized tobit estimates, marginal e¤ects.
*, **, *** indicate signicance at a 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Base: Low skilled,
HCMC, household enterprise. All regressions included a constant term. Estimates in column
3 are based on Mills ratios calculated using estimates where revenue growth is excluded in
the debt incidence equation, and log revenue is excluded in the unconstrained equation.
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GAP = dc
fc
f
+ duc
fuc
f
  da = xc1
fc
f
+ duc
fuc
f
  da (6)
where fc is the number of constrained rms, and fuc is the number of uncon-
strained rms, so f = fc + fuc. The vector xc contains the means of observables
for the constrained rms, and ^1 is the estimate of 1 taken from Table 3. The
average desired debt to asset share was estimated to be 34 percent larger than the
actual debt to asset share for constrained Vietnamese rms. These results indicate
that even though rejected applicants and discouraged borrowers amount to only 14
percent of the sample, Vietnamese SMEs would acquire on average 7 percent more
debt if credit constraints were removed.
3 The cost of capital
In this section I take the analysis one step further and focus on the group that
at some point in time were able to obtain credit from either formal or informal
sources. Table 4 gives an overview of enterprises having accessed credit even though
they consider themselves credit constrained. As reported above 14 percent of the
enterprises are credit constrained, and 53 percent hold positive debt. However,
during the 1994-2002 period 45 percent (72 out of 160) of the constrained rms
managed to get access to some external funds. Moreover, 61 rms out of the 582
that did not get credit access during the 1994-2002 period had debt obtained before
1994. Only 48 percent of the non-constrained rms applied for and got a loan,
conrming that many SMEs use internal funds to nance new investments.
Table 5 reports sample means of selected variables for the enterprises that have
accessed credit, and for sub-samples divided by source of credit. First, the monthly
interest rate charged is 0.6 percent on average and collateral was required in only
42 percent of the cases. Dividing by informal (private moneylender and friends
and relatives) and formal segments (private and government banks, enterprises and
poverty alleviation and job creation programmes)7 it can be seen that the informal
7Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) took over the functions of the Vietnam Bank for
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Table 4: Debt, Credit Access and Constraints
Positive debt No debt Total
Constrained 93 67 160
Not constrained 505 454 959
Total 598 521 1119
Credit accessed No credit accessed Total
Constrained 72 88 160
Not constrained 465 494 959
Total 537 582 1119
Credit accessed No credit accessed Total
Positive debt 537 61 598
No debt 0 521 521
Total 537 582 1119
sector makes up around 30-35 percent of the credit market, depending on whether
the measure is divided by source or by amount of credit.8 Government banks
(State Owned Commercial Banks, SOCBs)9 provide approximately 40 percent of
the credit, whereas private banks only make up for 5 percent of the total credit
extended to manufacturing rms in Vietnam. Compared to the results reported
in McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999a), where most private rms are excluded from
formal nancial markets (only 21 percent received formal bank loans), it seems as
if formal credit possibilities have increased since 1995-96.
Informal credit is characterized by loans where no collateral is required, but
the interest rate ranges between 0 percent and as high as 6 percent per month,
depending on whether the source of credit is a private moneylender (average 1.9
the Poor and the Peoples Credit Fund network. VBSP concentrates its government subsidized
lending to poor households and businesses in remote areas. (World Bank, 2003)
8Duong and Izumida (2002) analyse credit issues for households in Vietnam. They report that
the informal sector only accounts for around 20% of total loans. However, my estimates are more
in line with those reported in McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999a) where the informal credit system
and trade credits play the most important role in supplying credit to SMEs.
9The four largest SOCBs are The Vietnamese Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development
(VBARD), the Industry and Commerce Bank of Vietnam (Incombank), Foreign Trade Bank of
Vietnam (Vietcombank) and the Vietnamese Bank for Investment and Development (VBID).
These are the leading banks in the banking system with more than 230 branches in all cities and
provinces in Vietnam. In 1999 the outstanding loan volume of the four SOCBs accounted for
73 per cent of all loans in the economy (Kovsted et al., 2004). Among the SOCBs it is mainly
Vietcombank and VBARD that have an extensive branch network at the district and village levels.
They are therefore the main lenders to private enterprises.
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Table 5: Mean Statistics
Credit Money- Friends Private Govern. Enter- Prog-
access lender and rel. bank bank prise ramme
Revenue growth 0.121 0.267 0.115 0.049 0.134 0.039 0.133
Interest rate (monthly, percent) 0.599 1.867 0.301 1.085 0.902 0.087 0.255
Loan amount (log) 10.299 10.402 9.899 9.789 10.844 11.079 9.520
Collateral 0.419 0.000 0.011 0.815 0.895 0.059 0.147
Relationship 0.654 0.600 0.733 0.778 0.524 0.941 0.667
Share of total credit supply 1.000 0.028 0.328 0.050 0.391 0.063 0.140
Observations 537 15 176 27 210 34 75
percent) or friends and relatives (average 0.3 percent). Note also that 73 percent of
friends and relatives did not charge any interest. This corresponds to the ndings in
McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999a) where interest rates paid by private manufacturing
rms in informal credit markets in Vietnam are as high as 4 percent to 7 percent
per month. One feature of the data is that rms obtaining loans from private
moneylenders experience relatively large revenue growth rates. Formal loans often
involve time-consuming procedures in fullling applications and other administra-
tive di¢ culties that slow down the loan approval processes. Firms which experience
increased demand for their products and wish to expand production may not have
the time to go through administrative di¢ culties in the formal credit system if they
want to seize the day. It is therefore possible that private moneylenders make
fast growing rms able to meet increasing demand.
Interest rate diversity in the formal credit market is also observed. Private
and government banks charge on average the highest interest rates (monthly rates
between 0.9-1.1 percent, on average) in the formal market, and in order to obtain a
loan from either of these two sources the rms are often required to o¤er collateral
(over 80 percent of the loans are collateralized). However, on average government
banks o¤er larger loans than can be obtained in informal credit markets. In our
sample, rms that obtain loans from private banks are characterized by being male
owned, with low skill, and operating a household enterprise in rural areas. This also
explains why the average loan amount from private banks in our sample is relatively
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small. Government credit programmes are characterized by o¤ering relatively small
loans (often to household enterprises), but at a low interest rate and often without
collateral requirements. Loans from other enterprises can in many cases be seen
as a form of interrm trade credit, which is often characterized by relatively low
rates of interest and collateral requirements. Moreover, the loans obtained are
relatively large, and in 94 percent of the cases the borrower has prior relations with
the creditor.10 This is in accordance with McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999b), who
show that interrm relationships are associated with larger credit, at a rate that
diminishes with time. However, this form of interrm credit relationships is more
common among private enterprises, cooperatives, and limited and share-holding
companies as compared to household SMEs.
3.1 Credit access and determinants of loan rates
Table 6 presents the results from analysing the determinants of credit access. Col-
umn 1 contains the full sample, whereas column 2 and 3 only consider constrained
and non-constrained enterprises, respectively. As described above a total of 537
enterprises accessed credit out of the 1119 sampled.
Consistent with previous studies for both developed (Uzzi, 1999) and developing
countries (Bigsten et al., 2003) I nd that rms are more likely to access credit if
they are larger in terms of total real revenue. Moreover, the probability of accessing
credit appears to be negatively related to rm age. This probably reects that older
rms nance investments using accumulated prots to a larger extent.
Turning to specic owner characteristics it appears that male owned rms ob-
tain credit more frequently than female owned rms. Moreover, looking at the
constrained sample the male entrepreneur is to a larger extent able to get access to
external funds as compared to his female counterpart. Education seems to play an
important role in the credit allocation process. The negative correlations between
being high or medium skilled and accessing credit might reect that owners with
10The relationship dummy takes on a value of one if the rm has borrowed from the creditor
before and zero otherwise.
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Table 6: Determinants of Credit Access
All Constrained Non-constrained
Assets (log)  0:003  0:046 0:008
(0:13) (0:64) 0:35
Revenue (log) 0:094 0:164 0:079
(5:17) (2:89) (4:03)
Revenue growth  0:006  0:087  0:003
(0:15) (0:98) (0:06)
Prot share  0:043 0:363  0:074
(0:38) (1:15) (0:61)
Age  0:005  0:010  0:004
(2:12) (1:68) (1:51)
Gender 0:073 0:223 0:063
(1:85) (1:82) (1:46)
High skilled  0:176  0:113  0:179
(4:15) (0:98) (3:85)
Medium skilled  0:129 0:044  0:153
(3:36) (0:41) (3:66)
Hanoi 0:134 0:303 0:097
(2:27) (1:47) (1:54)
Haiphong 0:123 0:247 0:112
(2:07) (1:17) (1:78)
Hatay 0:410  0:010 0:448
(7:35) (0:04) (7:71)
Long An 0:323  0:046 0:359
(5:47) (0:19) (5:83)
Phu Tho 0:449  0:015 0:492
(7:47) (0:06) (7:88)
Quang Nam 0:324 0:213 0:315
(4:68) (0:87) (4:19)
Private rm 0:067  0:081 0:084
(1:11) (0:55) (1:24)
Cooperative 0:047  0:173 0:069
(0:70) (0:83) (0:95)
Limited/Share holding 0:083  0:226 0:132
(1:24) (1:28) (1:74)
Observations 1119 160 959
Pseudo R-squared 0:11 0:17 0:14
Probit estimates, marginal e¤ects. *, **, *** indicate signicance at a
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Base: Low skilled, HCMC, household
enterprise. All regressions included a constant term.
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higher educational levels have lower demand for credit or that better educated own-
ers are more likely to know when their application will be rejected and therefore
refrain from applying.
Looking at rm characteristics it is clear that location is of signicant importance
in determining access to credit. In our sample the probability of accessing credit
is higher in rural (Hatay, Long An, Phu Tho and Quang Nam) than in urban
areas (HCMC, Hanoi, Haiphong). In previous sections I noted that the demand for
credit is higher in rural areas and although rural areas also experience larger credit
constraints, it seems as if some part of the credit demand in rural areas is successfully
fullled. Moreover, most of government bank credit is allocated towards rural areas
(not reported) conrming that local governments often are distinctly protective of
rms in rural areas, which are more oriented towards serving local markets and
therefore tend to escape some of the credit barriers inherent in larger, possibly
more outward oriented markets. The ownership legal structure does not seem to
be an important determinant for credit access in Vietnam. Only in the case of the
non-constrained sample (column 3) is there an indication of limited liability and
share-holding companies experiencing signicantly higher access to credit than the
smaller household enterprises.
Regressions that explain the variation in the interest rate quoted on the most
recent loan are reported in Table 7. First, rms holding debt pay larger interest on
current loans. However, when controlling for loan specic characteristics this e¤ect
disappears. Consistent with other studies (Petersen and Rajan, 1994, for the US),
there is a statistically signicant indication of rm size (measured by total assets)
being negatively related to the cost of capital, but measured in terms of real revenue
a positive e¤ect emerges. The average combined e¤ect of these two measures of size
is negative. That is, larger rms get cheaper credit, which corresponds well with the
results obtained in Uzzi (1999) for U.S. non-agricultural SMEs. Firm age does not
seem to play a signicant role as a determinant of cost of capital, which is contrary
to the ndings in Petersen and Rajan (1994).11 Firms reputation measured by
11Squared terms were included, but gave no statistically signicant outcome.
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Table 7: Cost of Capital Determinants
(1) (2) (3)
Coe¤ t-stats Coe¤ t-stats Coe¤ t-stats
Assets (log)  0:030 (0:80)  0:103 (2:90)  0:082 (2:90)
Debt share 0:341 (2:56)  0:175 (1:29)  0:121 (0:96)
Revenue (log) 0:037 (1:28) 0:047 (1:68) 0:051 (2:16)
Revenue growth  0:059 (1:11)  0:048 (0:99)  0:060 (1:14)
Prot share 0:191 (1:13) 0:126 (0:74)  0:015 (0:11)
Age  0:002 (0:62)  0:000 (0:12) 0:001 (0:18)
Loan amount (log) 0:049 (2:32) 0:023 (1:18)
Collateral 0:424 (8:20) 0:153 (2:96)
Relationship  0:168 (3:58)  0:145 (3:17)
Moneylender 1:092 (2:86)
Friends and relatives  0:403 (6:01)
Private Bank 0:268 (4:98)
Enterprise  0:640 (7:83)
Programme  0:460 (7:45)
Observations 537 537 537
R-squared 0.17 0.28 0.50
Robust t-statistics, marginal e¤ects. *, **, *** indicate signicance at a 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively. Base: Government bank. All regressions included a constant term, owner
characteristic, location and legal structure dummies. Loans were granted between 1994 and
2002. Time dummies for the year the loan was granted are therefore included. Only the most
recent loan is considered.
the age of the rm therefore does not seem to inuence the interest rates facing
Vietnamese SMEs.
Turning to column 2 in Table 7, the size of the loan has a positive inuence on
the interest paid. However, this e¤ect does not hold when controlling for source
(column 3). Contrary to results normally found in the literature collateral is posi-
tively correlated with interest rates.12 Explanations for this result may be found in
the somewhat adverse lending criteria facing the State Owned Commercial Banks
(SOCBs) in Vietnam. Although the government has announced that policy-induced
lending is being phased out, policy lending has remained a dening characteris-
tic of the SOCBs (Kovsted et al., 2004). Other loan criteria than economic ones
may therefore have a signicant inuence when evaluating loan applications and
12Analyzing the sub-sample where only strictly positive interest is charged does not change the
overall picture reported in Table 5
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Table 8: Government versus Private Banks
Government Bank Private Bank
Coe¤ t-stats Coe¤ t-stats
Loan amount (log)  0:008 (0:51)  0:078 (2:98)
Collateral 0:108 (2:33)  0:215 (5:21)
Relationship  0:019 (0:72) 0:139 (5:05)
Observations 210 27
Robust t-statistics, marginal e¤ects. *, **, *** indicate signicance at a
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Base: Low skilled, HCMC, household
enterprise. All regressions included a constant term, owner characteristic,
rm characteristic, location, and time dummies.
given that government banks provide a major share of the credit the normal pic-
ture between collateral and interest rates may well be distorted. Table 8 gives an
indication of the above argument. Looking strictly at private banks, larger loan
amounts and loans based on collateral are charged with signicantly lower interest
rates, as found in most of the related literature. Government banks charge sig-
nicantly higher interest rates on collateralized loans, indicating that government
banks may use other/di¤erent criteria for determining interest rates.
As could be expected from the summary statistics in Table 4 a positive signi-
cant e¤ect on the cost of capital exists when borrowing from private moneylenders,
but also when borrowing from private banks as compared to loans obtained from
government banks. Relatives, friends, other enterprises and government credit pro-
grammes charge signicantly lower interest rates than government banks. Finally,
from Table 7 it is clear that rms which have borrowed from the creditor before
(Relationship), and have built up some kind of business relationship are faced with
signicantly lower costs of capital. This result is consistent with ndings from the
US (Berger and Udell, 1995, and Uzzi, 1999) where rms with longer banking rela-
tionships borrow at lower rates. However, note from Table 8 (in the case of private
banks) that relationship lending is associated with larger interest rates.
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4 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was two fold. First, I used direct information to identify credit
constrained rms, and found that approximately 14 percent of Vietnamese SMEs
are nancially constrained. Removal of this constraint was estimated to increase
external debt by around 7 percent on average. At a rst glance this might seem as
a relatively small e¤ect. However for the constrained group a removal of constraints
would boost liabilities by around 34 percent. Second, I analysed rms, which get
access to credit, and examined the empirical determinants of credit availability
and the interest rate on the most recent loan. The analysis demonstrated that:
a) Larger rms get cheaper credit. b) Informal credit markets play an important
role for fast growing rms, suggesting that enterprises may not have the time to
go through administrative di¢ culties in the formal credit system if they want to
seize the day. c) While the probability of accessing credit is higher in rural
areas, rural rms experience at the same time larger credit constraints, indicating
that demand for external funds is signicantly higher in rural areas than in the
larger urban cities. d) Non-household enterprises often face larger credit constraints,
suggesting that a shift in policy focus from the smaller household rms towards
supporting larger private and limited liability companies is needed. e) Borrower-
lender relationships reduce interest rates, indicating that relationship lending gives
important information about borrower quality in the segmented Vietnamese credit
market. f) Finally, collateralized loans face larger interest rates, explained by the
signicant inuence of policy lending in Vietnamese credit markets.
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